"'I'll make old vases for you if you want them—will make them just as I made these.' He had visions of a room full of golden brown beard. It was the most appalling thing he had ever witnessed, and there was no trickery about it. The beard had actually grown before his eyes, and it had now reached to the second button of the Clockwork man's waistcoat. And, at any moment, Mrs. Masters might return! "Worth stealing," a Society journalist lounging by remarked. "I could write a novel, only I can never think of a plot. Your old housekeeper is asleep long ago. Where do you carry your latchkey?" "Never lose your temper," he said. "It leads to apoplexy. Ah, my fine madam, you thought to pinch me, but I have pinched you instead." How does that strike you, Mr. Smith? Fancy Jerusha Abbott, (individually) ever pat me on the head, Daddy? I don't believe so-- The confusion was partly inherited from Aristotle. When discussing the psychology of that philosopher, we showed that his active Nous is no other than the idea of which we are at any moment actually conscious. Our own reason is the passive Nous, whose identity is lost in the multiplicity of objects with which it becomes identified in turn. But Aristotle was careful not to let the personality of God, or the supreme Nous, be endangered by resolving it into the totality of substantial forms which constitute Nature. God is self-conscious in the strictest sense. He thinks nothing but himself. Again, the subjective starting-point of305 Plotinus may have affected his conception of the universal Nous. A single individual may isolate himself from his fellows in so far as he is a sentient being; he cannot do so in so far as he is a rational being. His reason always addresses itself to the reason of some one else—a fact nowhere brought out so clearly as in the dialectic philosophy of Socrates and Plato. Then, when an agreement has been established, their minds, before so sharply divided, seem to be, after all, only different personifications of the same universal spirit. Hence reason, no less than its objects, comes to be conceived as both many and one. And this synthesis of contradictories meets us in modern German as well as in ancient Greek philosophy. 216 "I shall be mighty glad when we git this outfit to Chattanoogy," sighed Si. "I'm gittin' older every minute that I have 'em on my hands." "What was his name?" inquired Monty Scruggs. "Wot's worth while?" "Rose, Rose—my dear, my liddle dear—you d?an't mean——" "I'm out of practice, or I shouldn't have skinned myself like this—ah, here's Coalbran's trap. Perhaps he'll give you a lift, ma'am, into Peasmarsh." Chapter 18 "The Fair-pl?ace." "Yes," replied Black Jack, "here they are," drawing a parchment from his pocket. "This is the handwriting of a retainer called Oakley." HoME大桥未久AV手机在线观看 ENTER NUMBET 0016eilie.com.cn
Selecting potential children and unconditional parental love
by
Davis J.
California State University,
Fullerton, California 92834-6868, USA.
johndavis@fullerton.edu
Bioethics. 2008 Jun;22(5):258-68.
ABSTRACTFor now, the best way to select a child's genes is to select a potential child who has those genes, using genetic testing and either selective abortion, sperm and egg donors, or selecting embryos for implantation. Some people even wish to select against genes that are only mildly undesirable, or to select for superior genes. I call this selection drift--the standard for acceptable children is creeping upwards. The President's Council on Bioethics and others have raised the parental love objection: Just as we should love existing children unconditionally, so we should unconditionally accept whatever child we get in the natural course of things. If we set conditions on which child we get, we are setting conditions on our love for whatever child we get. Although this objection was prompted by selection drift, it also seems to cover selecting against genes for severe impairments. I argue that selection drift is not inconsistent with the ideal of unconditional parental love and, moreover, that the latter actually implies that we should practise selection drift--in other words, we should try to select potential children with the best genetic endowments. My endowment argument for the second claim works from an analogy between arranging an endowment prior to conception to fund a future child's education, and arranging a genetic endowment by selecting a potential child who already has it, where in both cases the child would not have existed without the endowment. I conclude with some programmatic remarks about the nonidentity problem.Biohappiness
Eugenics talk
Reprogenetics
'Saviour siblings'
Liberal Eugenics
'Designer babies'
Private eugenics
Personal genomics
Psychiatric genetics
Eugenics before Galton
Scandanavian eugenics
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis
Gene therapy and performance enhancement
Preimplantation genetics and stem cell therapy
The commercialisation of pre-natal enhancement
Refs
and further readingHOME
Resources
Wireheading
BLTC Research
cognitive-enhancers.com
Superhappiness?
Utopian Surgery?
The Good Drug Guide
The Abolitionist Project
The Hedonistic Imperative
The Reproductive Revolution
MDMA: Utopian Pharmacology
Critique of Huxley's Brave New World